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Co-evolutionary games on networks
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We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner’s dilemma against their neighbors.
The resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash
equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria, avalanches of mutations reestablish a stationary
state. Scale-free avalanche distributions are observed that are in accordance with calculations from
the Nash equilibria and a confined branching process. The transition from subcritical to critical
avalanche dynamics can be traced to a change in the degeneracy of the cooperative macrostate and
is observed for many variants of this game.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,87.23.Kg,89.75.Hc,89.75.Da
I. INTRODUCTION
Much research has been devoted to the statistical
physics of complex systems with game theoretic inter-
actions recently. One motivation are economic systems
composed of a large number of agents with simple lo-
cal interactions giving rise to complex global structures
and dynamics [1]. In particular, the problem of stabil-
ity and uniqueness of equilibria in economic systems has
been readdressed in the context of the aggregate behav-
ior of individual agents [2]. Game theory [3] and the the-
ory of evolutionary games [4] provide a sufficient frame-
work for modeling individual interactions whereas spa-
tial structures has to be taken into account to tackle co-
evolutionary dynamics of real-world systems [5, 6, 7].
Here, we will consider random networks of agents
which face a social dilemma or, in physical terms, a frus-
trated interaction. Imagine a situation where each player
can take two actions, say cooperating or defecting. The
optimal global outcome would be achieved by all play-
ers cooperating. But an individual player can gain much
more when exploiting the cooperators by defecting. Such
a situation is called a social dilemma or a frustrated inter-
action. The central question is how social order is possi-
ble and how cooperative behavior can emerge. Examples
for such spatially extended dilemmas are biological net-
works, where connected plants may or may not decide to
share resources [8], the analysis of internet congestion [9],
models for economic communication [10], and, of course,
many sociological problems from conflict research to pub-
lic transportation [11, 12].
A simple model system is given by the iterated Pris-
oner’s dilemma (IPD) [11, 13] with co-evolutionary dy-
namics. The Prisoner’s dilemma game is probably the
most prominent example of a basic model for the emer-
gence of cooperative behavior in social, economic, and
biological systems. It provides a frustrated two-particle
interaction and has been extensively studied by physi-
cists, economists, biologists, and mathematicians.
∗Electronic address: ebel@theo-physik.uni-kiel.de
A spatially extended Prisoner’s dilemma was first
proposed by Axelrod who concluded that territoriality
strongly influences the evolution of cooperation [11]. Ex-
tensive work on the spatial Prisoner’s dilemma started
in 1992 when Nowak and May explored a cellular au-
tomaton based on this game on regular lattices. They
and others found complex spatiotemporal dynamics and
emergence of cooperation for strategy spaces confined to
the strategies defecting and cooperating [14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19]. For the Prisoner’s dilemma on lattices and strategy
spaces confined to only cooperating and defecting (and
Tit-For-Tat in [20]), methods from theoretical physics,
as Monte-Carlo simulations, percolation theory, the the-
ory of (nonequilibrium) phase transitions, and the con-
cept of self-organized criticality, were used to understand
why cooperators or defectors dominate or coexist in the
system [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Lindgren and Nordahl
introduced players which act erroneously sometimes, al-
lowing a complex evolution of strategies in an unbounded
strategy space [26]. Others found that the limitation of a
player’s memory to the last encounter, which translates
to a bounded strategy space, does not provide a signifi-
cant drawback for the players [27, 28, 29]. Evolutionary
games on networks, again with only two strategies, have
been studied to ask questions how spatial organization
influences the transition from defecting to cooperating
[30] and how the players themselves may influence the
network topology [31]. In the following, we will study
the Prisoner’s dilemma on a network with a larger but
bounded strategy space and co-evolutionary dynamics
that lead to Nash equilibria as stationary states. It will
be shown both numerically and theoretically that pay-
off matrix, strategy space, and topology are crucial to
answer the question which equilibria will occur and how
stable they are. In particular, critical avalanches of mu-
tations are observed for such games and will be explained
in detail.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the spatially extended iterated Prisoner’s dilemma is de-
scribed as well as its co-evolutionary dynamics. This
is followed in Section III by numerical investigations of
avalanche dynamics showing three distinct regimes due
to changes in payoff matrix and topology. The observed
2Nash equilibria are described and explained in Section
IV which enables us to understand the critical value of
the control parameter of the payoff matrix. A confined
branching process is introduced in Section V clarifying
the relaxation mechanism and the emergence of scale-free
behavior. Conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. A CO-EVOLUTIONARY SPATIALLY
EXTENDED IPD
We start with a network withN players as nodes where
each player plays an iterated Prisoner’s dilemma game
against each of its neighbors. The Prisoner’s dilemma
is a two-person game with two possible actions in each
encounter. The payoff matrix of the first player for the
two strategies cooperating and defecting (denoted by sˆ1
and sˆ2) is given by
A =
(
3 0
5 1
)
= (aij)i,j ∈{1,2}, (1)
with the entries aij = pˆi1(sˆi, sˆj). pˆi1(sˆi, sˆj) is the payoff
of player 1 if player 1 plays strategy sˆi and player 2 plays
sˆj . The game is symmetric, i.e. pˆi1(sˆi, sˆj) = pˆi2(sˆj , sˆi).
Therefore, the corresponding payoff matrix of the sec-
ond player is the transpose of the first player’s matrix.
The Prisoner’s dilemma game in general is defined by the
relations
a12 < a22 < a11 < a21 and a12 + a21 < 2a11. (2)
Hence, in one encounter of the Prisoner’s dilemma, de-
fecting is the strategy that yields the best payoff regard-
less of the opponent’s strategy. This is no longer the case
in the iterated game where mutual cooperation is more
favorable than both players defecting or switching be-
tween defecting and cooperating. That is the reason why
this system is a frustrated system. In each encounter,
defecting would maximize a player’s payoff. But in the
long run, when players will anticipate each other’s action,
cooperation will in general do much better.
A. IPD with memory on a network
Let us further specify the strategy space and payoff
function of the spatial game. A strategy is viewed as
a mapping of an agent’s “knowledge” to an “action”.
“Knowledge” of an agent is given by the previous moves
the agent can take into account to decide which action
it will take next. We define the memory length m of a
player as the number of these previous moves and con-
fine the memory of the agents to m = 1, i.e. an agent
remembers only its opponent player’s last action. If one
player encounters another player it has to decide on its
first move without any information about the opponent.
Accordingly, the opening move is part of the strategy,
History Action
0 1
1 1
First move 1
TABLE I: Representation of the strategy of one agent with
memory m = 1 (0: defection, 1: cooperation). The agent
determined by the above strategy is an unconditioned coop-
erator. It cooperates no matter whether its opponent has
cooperated or defected in the last move.
too, which can be represented as a lookup table or a bi-
nary string (Tab. I). The finite number of moves of one
encounter is not known by any agent. In the course of
the game, one player has to play against each of its neigh-
bors on the network. Thereafter, its payoff is given by
the average payoff per move and neighbor.
The strategy space of a player i consists of up to 8
pure strategies Si ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} (cf. Tab. II for
definition of the strategies). The pure-strategy space
of the game is S = ×
i∈I
Si with the set of the players
I = {0, 1, · · · , n}. The (pure strategy) payoff function
pii : S → R does not depend on the whole pure strategy
profile s = (s1, · · · , sn) but only on the strategies of the
neighboring nodes pii = pii(si, neigh(i)) and, of course, on
the payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s dilemma game. Here,
the set of the neighbors of a node i is denoted neigh(i).
With pi(s) = (pi1(s), · · · , pin(s)) the above defined game
(S, I, pi) is a finite normal-form game. Such games in
general have at least one Nash equilibrium [32]. Here,
only pure strategies will be considered neglecting possible
mixed-strategy equilibria. In this setting, sD = (0, · · · , 0)
and sTFT = (6, · · · , 6) are Nash equilibria for any payoff
matrix A obeying (2) and for a sufficiently high number
of moves, which can be easily verified. The former equi-
librium consists of players always defecting, whereas in
the latter state each player repeats its opponent’s last
move (Tit-For-Tat) with a cooperative opening move (cf.
Tab. II ).
B. Co-evolutionary dynamics
Let us now introduce mutations of a player’s strategy.
The lookup table determining the strategy is viewed as a
bit string of length 2m+1, wherem is the memory length
as defined above. This bit-string will then be mutated
during the iteration of the game.
At the beginning, a random network with a given mean
degree 〈k〉 is generated [41]. The strategies are assigned
randomly, too. All agents play against each of their
neighbors initially to update their payoffs. Thereafter,
the following steps are iterated: (i) One agent i is cho-
sen randomly and its strategy is mutated from si to a
strategy s′i ∈ Si picked out at random. (ii) The mutated
agent plays again against its neighbors and its payoff is
3No. Strategy Acronym Bit String
0 always defect sD 000
1 suspicious anti-Tit-For-Tat sATFT 001
2 suspicious Tit-For-Tat sTFT 010
3 suspicious cooperate sC 011
4 generous defect gD 100
5 generous anti-Tit-For-Tat gATFT 101
6 generous Tit-For-Tat gTFT 110
7 always cooperate gC 111
TABLE II: The strategy space of each player consists of up to
8 different pure strategies comprehending all possible strate-
gies for a memory of one move. The first lower case letter of
the acronym describes the first move: “s” for defecting (sus-
picious) and “g” for cooperating (generous). If the strategy
is coded as a bit string the assigned numbers correspond to
the respective binary numbers.
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FIG. 1: Probability distribution P (M) of avalanche size M
for the subcritical case. The avalanche size M is given by the
number of mutation events necessary to reestablish an equilib-
rium. With the temptation to defect in the range 3 < a21 ≤ 4,
only small avalanches are necessary to reestablish the coop-
erative equilibrium. The open diamonds show data obtained
for the spatially extended Prisoner’s dilemma averaged over
50 random networks (N = 200, 〈k〉 = 2, a21 = 3.5). The
mechanism of relaxation is a branching process confined to
the same topology (dashed curve, α = 0.235, cf. Sec. V).
compared to the former result. The mutation is accepted
in the case of a higher payoff, pii(s1, s2, . . . , s
′
i, . . . , sN) >
pii(s1, s2, . . . , si, . . . , sN ) , and the payoffs of all neigh-
bors are also updated. This corresponds to the assump-
tions that accepting any mutation is combined with some
costs to the player and that mutations occur on a time
scale slower than the time scale of the game. Iteration
of this process leads to a stationary state with a fixed
strategy distribution. In the stationary state, no agent
can improve its payoff by changing its strategy whereas
the other players’ strategies remain unchanged. This
state corresponds to the game theoretic Nash equilibrium
[32, 33]. Note that, for its decisions, no more information
than a player’s own payoff is required.
III. PERTURBATIONS AND AVALANCHES
One essential property of evolutionary games is given
by the equilibria or the evolutionarily stable states. All
stationary states of the game are Nash equilibria. An
interesting question is the stability of these equilibria
against perturbations. In the following, we will study
the dynamics of avalanches of mutation events follow-
ing a perturbation of the Nash equilibrium. After the
system has reached a stationary state, a new strategy
is assigned to a random player. The insertion of a sub-
optimal strategy offers new opportunities for mutations
to the perturbed player itself and to its neighbors. Since
players are updated randomly, a perturbation leads to an
avalanche of mutations until a stationary state is reached
again. One quantity of interest is the avalanche size M
given by the number of mutations necessary to reestablish
the equilibrium and its dependence on the payoff matrix
A. We will first discuss the numerical results for the case
of players on a random network. The second part of this
section deals with a Prisoner’s dilemma on a ring, which
will be the starting point for the theoretical treatment in
the next two sections.
In the case of sparsely connected random networks, one
observes three distinct regimes of the avalanche dynam-
ics, with the temptation to defect a21 as control param-
eter. For small temptations, 3 < a21 ≤ 4, a subcritical
regime occurs where large avalanches are suppressed ex-
ponentially (Fig. 1). For a21 > 4, critical behavior occurs
with avalanche sizes distributed according to a power law
P (M) ∝M−γ with the scaling exponent γ = 1.39± 0.10
(Fig. 2) and a cutoff scaling linearly with system size N .
This critical regime is followed by a supercritical regime
for 4.70 ≤ a21 < 6 with an enhanced probability of very
large events (Fig. 3).
Thus, above a critical value of the temptation to de-
fect ac21 = 4, small perturbations of the system lead
to long lasting avalanches that affect all players of the
whole system with a mean avalanche size that diverges in
the thermodynamic limit. The transition from a regime
with small avalanches to a critical one with system-wide
avalanches is robust in case of moderate changes of the
strategy space S and the mean degree 〈k〉. It also oc-
curs for smaller strategy spaces Si with card(Si) ≥ 5 and
{0, 6, 7} ⊂ Si. The qualitative behavior remains even for
indefinitely iterated games or with a very different payoff
matrix [42], which is sometimes used in the context of
the Prisoner’s dilemma
Aˆ =
(
1 0
aˆ21 0
)
. (3)
With Si = {0, 7} and Aˆ but quite different evolutionary
dynamics, Lim, Chem, and Jayaprakash found critical
avalanches on a two-dimensional square lattice, too [25].
The different regimes of relaxation dynamics can be
explained by a closer look on the structure of the Nash
equilibria involved (Sec. IV) as well as on the relaxation
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FIG. 2: Probability distribution P (M) of avalanche size M
(number of mutations events) for the critical case on a ran-
dom network. The subcritical regime is followed by critical
behavior with 4 < a21 < 4.70. The distribution (open di-
amonds, average over 50 networks with N = 200, 〈k〉 = 2,
and a21 = 4.5) can be well approximated by a power law
P (M) ∝M−γ with γ = 1.39± 0.10 over three orders of mag-
nitude (solid line). The scale-free behavior can be explained
by a confined branching process (dashed curve, α = 0.315, cf.
Sec. V).
mechanism which is given by a confined branching pro-
cess (Sec. V). Before we start these considerations in
the next two sections, we briefly discuss the case of a co-
evolutionary Prisoner’s dilemma on a ring, i.e. on the reg-
ular network where each player’s degree is exactly ki = 2.
Although this is not a very reasonable model for real spa-
tially extended systems, it will give some useful insights
and will allow us to calculate some properties of the spa-
tially extended game analytically.
Like for random networks, subcritical, critical, and su-
percritical regimes occur, with subcritical avalanche dis-
tributions in the range of 3 < a21 ≤ 4 and supercritical
behavior for 4.12 ≤ a21 < 6. However, this time the
critical avalanche distribution has a scaling exponent of
γ = 1.04± 0.05 which significantly differs from the expo-
nent obtained for random networks (Fig. 4).
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIA AND THEIR
DEPENDENCE ON THE PAYOFF MATRIX
The set of possible stationary states of the co-
evolutionary Prisoner’s dilemma is the set of Nash equi-
libria which, as has been shown above, contains for all
a21 ∈ (3, 6) the defective equilibrium sD = (0, . . . , 0) and
the Tit-For-Tat equilibrium sTFT = (6, . . . , 6). One can
also consider the macrostates of the system correspond-
ing to the aggregated behavior of the agents. Identifying
cooperative moves with “spin up” and defecting moves
with “spin down” the macroscopic behavior at one in-
stant of time is the magnetization of the system. Thus,
the strategy profile sD of all agents playing strategy 0
corresponds to the minimal magnetization −1 whereas
the Tit-For-Tat equilibrium sTFT leads to the maximal
magnetization +1.
M
P
(
M
)
10
8
10
7
10
6
10
5
10
4
10
3
10
3
101
1
10
 2
10
 4
10
 6
10
 8
10
 10
FIG. 3: Probability distribution P (M) of avalanche size M
(number of mutation events) in the supercritical regime on a
random network. For high values of the temptation to defect,
4.7 ≤ a21 < 6, a supercritical distribution of the avalanche
size is observed (open diamonds, average over 50 networks,
N = 200, 〈k〉 = 2, a21 = 4.7). Again, a confined branch-
ing process appears to match the relaxation dynamics well
(dashed curve, α = 0.390, cf. Sec. V).
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FIG. 4: Probability distribution P (M) of avalanche size M
(number of mutation events) on a ring in the critical regime.
In the range 4.01 ≤ a21 ≤ 4.11, critical behavior in terms of
the avalanche distribution is also observed for the Prisoner’s
dilemma on a ring (N = 200, a21 = 4.1). The scale-free dis-
tribution P (M) ∝ M−γ has an exponent of γ = 1.04 ± 0.05
which is significantly smaller than the scaling exponent ob-
served for the same game on a random network with identical
mean degree 〈k〉. The experimental data agree very well with
the behavior of a branching process confined to a ring (dashed
curve, α = 0.512, cf. Sec. V).
A. Equilibria on rings and random networks
Starting with the experimental findings for a ring
topology, one observes three regimes in terms of adopted
equilibria which are exactly matched by the three dif-
ferent regimes of avalanche dynamics. In the subcritical
regime, the stationary states are a mixture of the strate-
gies 6 and 7, i.e. generous-Tit-For-Tat players and uncon-
ditioned cooperators, respectively (Tab. II). Only gener-
ous Tit-For-Tat prevails in the critical regime. With the
onset of supercritical behavior, the defective equilibrium
sD turns up. Its fraction of the equilibria reached by the
game grows very fast with further increasing temptation
5to defect. The first transition can be explained by a sim-
ple calculation of the Nash equilibria. With a21 ≤ 4,
the cooperative macrostate is degenerated in many Nash
equilibria since unconditioned cooperators are stabilized
by neighbors with the strategy gTFT. Consider a player
i with its neighbors playing si−1 = 7 (i.e. generous co-
operate or gC) and si+1 = 6 (gTFT). Then player i has
to find a strategy being a compromise between exploiting
the cooperator at i−1 and maintaining cooperation with
its other neighbor, the smarter Tit-For-Tat player at i+1.
However, for a21 ≤ 4, there is no such strategy yielding
a better payoff than gTFT or even gC. This stabilization
of the credulously cooperating agents gives rise to a de-
generacy of the cooperative macrostate in many different
strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria, diverging faster
than 22N/3 with the size of the ring. On the other hand,
if a21 > 4 there always exists such a compromise strat-
egy and the degeneracy vanishes. That means that below
the critical value ac21 = 4 the macrostate with magneti-
zation +1 is strongly degenerated in many Nash equilib-
ria whereas above ac21 there is only one Nash equilibrium
with maximal magnetization left regardless of system size
(sTFT). The other macrostate with minimal magnetiza-
tion is never degenerated since sD is the only Nash equi-
librium that leads to such a defective macrostate. In case
of regular lattices with different numbers of next neigh-
bors k, the critical value ac21 is given by
ac21(k) = 4
2k + 1
k + 3
. (4)
For example, in the case of a two-dimensional lattice
with periodic boundary conditions and a von-Neumann
neighborhood, we find subcritical, critical, and supercrit-
ical behavior, with ac21 ≈ 5.14 and a critical exponent of
γ = 1.3 ± 0.2. Of course, for every payoff matrix A sat-
isfying (2) exists a finite value for the number of next
neighbors k above which the cooperative macrostate is
always degenerated. However, a11 and a21 can be ad-
justed to increase this border to arbitrarily large val-
ues. Nonetheless, there is a reason why, for every pay-
off matrix, true critical behavior can only take place in
sparsely connected networks which will be discussed in
the next section. Why are only cooperative equilibria
observed in both the subcritical and the critical range of
a21? Looking closer at the way to the equilibrium, there
are (σ2(σ + 1)(σ − 1))/2 transition probabilities for a
player i changing its strategy, with σ := card(Si). When
increasing the temptation to defect a21, some of these
rules change from 0 to a finite value and the respective
inverse rule vice versa. At the transition to the supercrit-
ical regime, where the defective equilibrium is reached for
the first time, exactly those rules change which govern the
stability of the border between cooperative and defective
domains. Below that threshold, the cooperative domains
grow and above it defecting strategies can spread.
The situation is slightly different on a random network.
Since there are always some nodes with a degree higher
than the mean degree 〈k〉, a small degeneracy of the co-
operative macrostate can exist even for a21 > a
c
21(〈k〉).
Moreover, disconnected compounds may be in different
equilibria at the same time. The highly connected nodes
stabilize the cooperative equilibrium so that even for
a21 <∼ 6 cooperating strategies predominate. Yet these
degeneracy does not compensate for the loss of coopera-
tive equilibrium profiles for temptations larger than ac21
which is the reason for the transition from subcritical to
critical behavior. The supercritical phase is again caused
by the change of transition rules leading to increasing
defective domains with their growth hindered by highly
connected cooperative nodes.
B. Nash equilibria and ESS
As we are dealing with an evolutionary game, the ques-
tion arises if any of the Nash equilibria is also evolution-
arily stable. A strategy profile is called an evolutionarily
stable state (ESS) if it is stable against the insertion of
a small but finite fraction of mutants playing a different
strategy [34, 35]. Therefore, an ESS is a strict Nash equi-
librium or a non-strict Nash equilibrium with the addi-
tional condition that other best replies play worse against
themselves than the ESS strategy against them. Note
that this concept is formulated for two-person games
where two players encounter each other by chance. In
this sense, both Nash equilibria sD = (0, · · · , 0) and
sTFT = (6, · · · , 6) are no ESS for Si = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
since other best replies score equally well as the equilib-
rium strategy (strategies 2 and 7, respectively). With
respect to strategy spaces reduced by 2 or 7, the respec-
tive (now strict) Nash equilibrium becomes an ESS. But
does this concept of stability apply to spatially extended
games? Many approaches to evolutionary stability lead
to the equivalence of ESS and strict Nash equilibria. So
one may conjecture that in a game with Si = {0, 1, 5, 6, 7}
the profile sD should be an ESS since it is a strict Nash
equilibrium. Yet, as the experiments show, a small per-
turbation can cause the system to change from the strict
Nash equilibrium sD to the non-strict cooperative equi-
librium sTFT. Thus, when applying the notion of evolu-
tionary stability to spatially extended systems, one has
to keep in mind that things may be different here since it
is the local surrounding that decides whether an invader
will overthrow the incumbent strategy or will fail instead.
V. BRANCHING PROCESSES AS A MODEL OF
THE RELAXATION PROCESS
Having understood the structure of the Nash equilibria
and their connection to the transition between different
regimes of avalanche dynamics, the question remains how
to explain the distinct form of the probability distribu-
tions P (M) and in particular the scaling exponents of the
critical regimes. In fact, the relaxation process can be de-
scribed by a type of branching process which very well
6predicts the scaling exponents for the different topolo-
gies as well as the subcritical and supercritical avalanche
distributions.
A. The Galton-Watson process
The starting point is a simple branching process, also
known as Galton-Watson process, which will be refor-
mulated in terms of mutated agents giving rise to future
mutations of other players. Let Zn be the number of
mutated players in the n-th generation. Each mutated
player can cause other mutations in the next generation,
with the probability pm that its mutation is succeeded by
m mutations in the next generation. The stochastic pro-
cess (Zn)n∈N0 is called a branching process of the Galton-
Watson type. Note that the number of generations con-
stitutes a time scale completely different from the time
scale of the game where at each instant of time one player
is chosen to mutate its strategy. With the initial condi-
tion Z0 = 1 and the total progeny Z :=
∑∞
i=0 Zi, the
quantity of interest is the distribution P (Z = r) of to-
tal progeny or, in other words, the avalanche size. So
far there is no spatial constraint to this process, i.e. Zi
is not bounded by the system size, and mutations inde-
pendently give birth to new mutations. The probability
pm that a mutation of a player with k neighbors will be
followed by m mutations in the next generation is given
by
pm =
(
k + 1
m
)
αm(1− α)k+1−m, (5)
being the simplest choice if a player’s mutation can only
affect its neighborhood including itself. Using generat-
ing functions [36] we calculate P (Z = r) for this special
Galton-Watson process with the same ki = k for all play-
ers to
P (Z = r) =
α− 1
αk
√
k + 1
2pik
(
kk
α(1 − α)k(k + 1)k+1
)−r
r−3/2.
(6)
It is useful to introduce the mean number of a mutation’s
“children” m¯ = α(k+1) = EZ0 and approximate (6) for
m¯ <∼ 1
P (Z = r) = Cr−3/2e
− r
r0 , (7)
with
r0 =
k + 1
2k
1
(1 − m¯)2
, (8)
and a constant
C =
m¯− k − 1
km¯
√
k + 1
2pik
. (9)
If the expectation of the numbers of descendants ap-
proaches one, i.e m¯ ↑ 1, the exponential cutoff diverges
Z0=1
B
Zn+1=3
Zn=2
Z1=2
A
FIG. 5: The branching process on a ring. Each node (circle)
is occupied by a player with the circle filled if the player’s
strategy has mutated in the respective generation. (A) The
initially mutated player causes its neighbors and itself to mu-
tate in the next generation with probability α (arrows). No
more players are affected since only its neighborhood and the
player itself can experience a different payoff due to the mu-
tation. (B) The progenies of mutated players in general are
not independent of each other. Two mutations can influence
the same site making the analytical treatment difficult.
with (1 − m¯)−2. The process becomes critical with a
scale-free avalanche distribution P (Z = r) ∝ r−3/2. If
m¯ > 1, the probability is finite that Z does not converge
at all [37]. The branching process described above, which
has no spatial constraints, is characterized by a subcriti-
cal, critical, and supercritical regime of its avalanche dy-
namics. Although this is very similar to the IPD on a
random network, in the case of a ring it yields a wrong
scaling exponent of γ = 3/2. Such behavior could be
gained equally well from a random walk of the number
of mutated sites with drift to a reflecting boundary. In
the following, we will show that it is the restriction of
the branching process to the network topology that com-
pletely explains the dynamics and leads to the correct
scaling exponents.
B. Confined branching processes
The confinement of the branching process leads to two
effects. First, Zn will be bounded by the system size N ;
second, the mutation events caused by mutated players
are no longer stochastically independent. We will denote
a branching process as confined or restricted to a network
(i) if there exists a one-to-one mapping of players and
nodes and (ii) if a mutated player can only give birth to
mutations in its neighborhood including itself (Fig. 5 A).
This corresponds to the fact that if a player changes its
strategy only the payoffs of its neighbors and of the player
itself will be affected. We assume that each neighbor
and the mutated site itself has the same probability α
of mutation in the next generation. With the random
7Dynamics αmf1 αmf2 α
subcritical 0.290 0.234 0.235
critical 0.340 0.306 0.315
supercritical 0.320 0.308 0.390
TABLE III: The branching parameter α, determined with
mean-field approaches. The parameter α, obtained for the
experimental distributions of the different regimes on a ran-
dom network (Figs. 1, 2, 3), is compared to mean-field results
using a random neighborhood and absorbing stable equilib-
rium states (αmf1) or averaged over realizations of the game
(αmf2).
variable X
(n)
ν being 1 if the player at node ν is mutated
in generation n and 0 otherwise, the confined process
(Z ′n)n∈N0 is defined by
Z ′n =
N∑
ν=1
X(n)ν . (10)
The probability of a mutation at site ν in generation n is
P (X(n)ν = 1) = 1− (1 − α)
λ, (11)
with
λ =
∑
µ∈neigh(ν)∪{ν}
X(n−1)µ . (12)
The confined branching process (Z ′n) can now be used
to calculate the avalanche distributions of the spatially
extended Prisoner’s dilemma numerically. Applying it to
random networks, both the subcritical and supercritical
distributions are matched well (dashed curves in Fig. 1
and Fig. 3). The distribution of the confined branching
process agrees even better with the experimental data in
the critical regime (dashed curves in Fig. 2). The same
is true for the Prisoner’s dilemma on a ring (Fig. 4). In
both critical cases, the branching process shows the cor-
rect finite-size scaling of the cutoff which is proportional
to the system size. Note that the critical regimes of the
game have different scaling exponents due to network
topology which are both correctly obtained by the con-
fined branching process. The critical exponents depend
only on the topology rather than on the parameter α of
the process. Therefore, the relaxation mechanism of the
spatially extended co-evolutionary Prisoner’s dilemma is
a confined branching process.
Mean-field approaches can be applied successfully to
explain the parameter α of the confined branching pro-
cess in the subcritical and critical regime (Tab. III). To
calculate a mean-field approximation αmf1 of the branch-
ing parameter, the transition probabilities of a mutated
agent’s neighbors are determined using a random neigh-
borhood for both the player and its neighbors. The struc-
ture of the game is taken into account only by assuming
that the stable strategies are absorbing states. A second
approach is to average the transition probabilities over
game realizations numerically, yielding αmf2. Both val-
ues, αmf1 and αmf2, agree well with the parameter α ob-
tained from the avalanche distributions of the subcritical
and critical regime. This corresponds to the explanation
that this transition occurs solely because of the change
in the degeneracy of the cooperative macrostate at the
critical value ac21. The supercritical case is not matched
by the mean-field approaches which may be due to the
fact that here the dynamics are governed by local effects,
i.e. the competitive growth at the boundaries between
cooperative and defective domains. The dynamics on a
ring topology can be explained by a similar mean-field
approach, too, if one assumes that the effective maxi-
mal number of a player’s descendants is approximately
two and not three. This reduction of potential progeny
is caused by the strong overlap of the neighborhoods in
this regular lattice (Fig. 5 B).
Although the definition of the confined Galton-Watson
process is quite intuitive and simple, its analytical treat-
ment is not. The reason is that mutation events has be-
come dependent on each other. Two mutations can affect
the same site in the next generation (Fig. 5 B) leading to
dependent recursive equations (11, 12) for the mutation
probability. With the simplification that the Z ′n mutated
sites of generation n are randomly distributed over the
network, one can shed some light on the critical behav-
ior of the confined branching process. The conditional
expectations of the number of mutated players are with
this assumption
E(Z ′n+1|Z
′
n) = m¯ Z
′
n (1 + ξ) (13)
with
ξ =
(
m¯
Z ′n
N
)−1[
1−
(
1−
1
k + 1
m¯
Z ′n
N
)k+1
− m¯
Z ′n
N
]
.
(14)
If ξ ≪ 1 and m¯ ≈ 1 the confined process approximately is
a martingale for all values of Z ′n and should show critical
behavior. For m¯ ≪ 1 the avalanche dynamics are sub-
critical as the process becomes a supermartingale. With
m¯≫ 1 obviously resulting in supercritical dynamics, the
remaining case of interest is m¯ ≈ 1. In the event of highly
connected networks with 〈k〉 ≫ 1 the correction ξ is of
the order −1 suppressing large avalanches. Thus critical
avalanche dynamics are expected only for sparsely con-
nected networks, for too strong dependencies of mutation
events lead to either subcritical or supercritical distribu-
tions of avalanche sizes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a spatially extended
Prisoner’s dilemma game with co-evolutionary dynamics
that lead to Nash equilibria as stationary states. We have
shown that critical avalanche dynamics are characteristic
8for a broad range of these games. The observed intermit-
tent evolution with sudden avalanches of activity is remi-
niscent of self-organized criticality [38, 39]. Depending on
the payoff matrix, subcritical, critical, and supercritical
regimes can be observed. Calculating the Nash equilibria
and introducing a confined branching process, we were
able to quantitatively explain the critical value of the
control parameter, i.e. the temptation to defect, and the
avalanche distributions. Therefore, investigations on the
spatially extended Prisoner’s dilemma, which has become
a widely used toy model for the emergence of coopera-
tion, have to take into account the stability of possible
equilibria depending on chosen payoff matrix, strategy
space, and topology. Complex behavior should only be
found for subcritical or critical dynamics whereas in the
supercritical regime small perturbations will totally mix
up the whole system preventing the evolution of local
structures. The results on the stability of the Nash equi-
libria and their connection to evolutionarily stable states
indicate that the concept of equilibrium, originating from
classical mechanics and brought into the fields of game
theory and evolution [40], has to be further specified to
take into account co-evolution on networks and other spa-
tial structures.
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